Revised 01/26/04
TERRORISTIC THREATS
(N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a))
Count of
the indictment charges defendant with
committing [a] terroristic threat[s].
[READ COUNT OF INDICTMENT]
That section of our statutes provides in
pertinent part:
A person is guilty of a crime if he
threatens to commit any crime of violence
with the purpose to
[CHOOSE APPLICABLE ALTERNATIVE]
terrorize another or in reckless disregard
of the risk of causing such terror
OR
cause evacuation of a building, place of
assembly or facility of public
transportation or in reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such evacuation
OR
otherwise to cause serious public
inconvenience or in reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such inconvenience.
In order to convict defendant of the charge,
the State must prove the following elements
beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That the defendant threatened to
commit a crime of violence.
2. That the threat was made with the
purpose to
[CHOOSE APPLICABLE ALTERNATIVE]
terrorize another or in reckless disregard
of the risk of causing such terror
OR
cause evacuation of a building, place of
assembly or facility of public
transportation or in reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such evacuation
OR
otherwise to cause serious public
inconvenience or in reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such inconvenience.
The first element that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant
threatened to commit any crime of violence.
The State alleges that defendant threatened
to commit the violent crime of
.
The words or actions of the defendant must
be of such a nature as to convey menace or
fear of a crime of violence to the ordinary
person. It is not a violation of this
statute if the threat expresses fleeting
anger or was made merely to alarm.
The second element that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt is that the threat
was made with the purpose to
[CHOOSE APPLICABLE ALTERNATIVE]
terrorize another or in reckless disregard
of the risk of causing such terror. In this
case, the State alleges that defendant
intended to terrorize (name of victim). The
State need not prove that the victim
actually was terrorized.
OR
to cause evacuation of a building, place of
assembly or facility of public
transportation or in reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such evacuation. In
this case, the State alleges that defendant
intended to cause the evacuation of (name of
location). The State need not prove that
there actually was an evacuation of a
building, place of assembly or facility of
public transportation.
OR
to cause serious public inconvenience or in
reckless disregard of the risk of causing
such inconvenience. In this case, the
State alleges that defendant intended to
cause serious public inconvenience by (set
forth allegation). The State need not prove
that there actually was serious public
inconvenience.
A person acts purposely with
respect to the nature of his/her conduct or
a result thereof if it is his/her conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result. A person acts
purposely with respect to attendant
circumstances if the individual is aware of
the existence of such circumstances or the
individual believes or hopes that they
exist. “With purpose,” “designed,” “with
design” or equivalent terms have the same
meaning.
A
person acts recklessly with respect to the
result of his/her conduct if he/she
consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will
occur from his/her conduct. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known
to the actor, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that
a reasonable person would observe in the
actor’s situation. One is said to act
recklessly if one acts with recklessness,
with scorn for the consequences, heedlessly,
or foolhardily.
The terms purposely and recklessly are
conditions of the mind. A condition of the
mind cannot be seen. It can only be
determined by inference from defendant’s
conduct, words or acts. A state of mind is
rarely susceptible of direct proof but must
ordinarily be inferred from the facts.
Therefore, it is not necessary that the
State produce witnesses to testify that an
accused said that he/she had a certain state
of mind when he/she did a particular thing.
It is within your power to find that such
proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable
doubt by inference which may arise from the
nature of his/her acts and conduct and from
all he/she said and did at the particular
time and place and from all surrounding
circumstances established by the evidence.
If you find that the State has proven all
the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant guilty. If, however, you find
that the State has failed to prove any of
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find defendant not guilty.
[CHARGE IF APPLICABLE]
If the State has proven defendant guilty of
committing [a] terroristic threat[s], then
you must further determine beyond a
reasonable doubt whether the threat was made
during a declared period of (choose
appropriate) national, State or county
emergency. In this case, the State alleges
that when defendant’s threat was made,
had declared a period of emergency. It
is no defense to the charge that the
defendant did not know that there was a
declared period of emergency at the time the
crime occurred.
If you find that the State has proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed a terroristic threat and that the
offense occurred during a declared period of
national, State or county emergency, then
you must find defendant guilty of committing
a terroristic threat during a declared
period of emergency. If you find that the
State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed a terroristic
threat but find that the State has failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
offense occurred during a declared period of
national, State or county emergency, then
you must find defendant not guilty of
committing a terroristic threat during a
declared period of emergency.
See Final Report of
the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision
Commission, Vol. II:
Commentary (October 1971).